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In today’s modern economies governments play a crucial role within the innovation 
system by setting regulations, establishing institutions, shaping capabilities and through direct 
support. In Germany as well as in other European countries the way in which public support 
has been granted to innovative projects by the firms has undergone a major change within the 
last two decades. While formerly mostly individual firms were publicly supported, from the 
1980s onwards, governments began to fund projects conducted by networks rather than 
individual firms. Germany has been no exception in this.  
Today, the vast majority of publicly funded R&D projects are conducted via 
collaboration. In the face of shrinking government budgets and intensified international 
competition in the field of technology, increasing the efficiency of innovation policies has 
become crucial. Hence, evaluations have shifted into focus for politicians and economists.  
Within the framework of evaluation approaches, the present study aims to investigate 
behavioural additionality effects with the focus on collaboration, i.e. changes in firms’ 
behaviour in terms of co-operation arising from publicly funded R&D projects. We ask 
whether public R&D funding is adequate for influencing firms’ collaborative behaviour. The 
data used in the empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Survey database, the 
German Federal Government's R&D funding database, the German Patent Office database 
and telephone interview survey data. We examine 659 German firms involved in R&D 
collaboration and investigate (i) whether public R&D funding stimulates firms to collaborate 
with a different set of partners (business firms, scientific institutions or both) compared to 
where public funding has not been received and by means of 142 observations (ii) whether 
newly initiated collaborations within a publicly funded R&D project are likely to last 
compared to already existing collaborations, after public funding has ended. 
Our first research question is: can public R&D funding be used as a trigger for 
involving new types of partners in a co-operation? To examine this effect, we characterise 
R&D partnerships as business-only, science-only and as involving the combination of both 
business and science partners. Within a nearest-neighbour matching approach, we compare 
the resulting sets of R&D collaborations between publicly-funded and non-publicly-funded 
firms.  In a second step using a bivariate probit analysis we investigate if a potential change 
lasts and ask: are newly initiated co-operations more likely, or at least as likely, to be 
continued compared to already existing co-operations?  
We find that public R&D funding is, in particular, a means of stimulating the inclusion 
of science as a new partner in industry R&D partnerships. In this respect, i.e. stimulating new 
and more diversified types of partnerships, public funding achieves its aim. However, we also 
show that newly initiated industry-science R&D co-operations are less likely to be continued 
after funding has ended compared to already existing co-operations. Overall, public funding 
tends to integrate science into business R&D partnerships, but these newly-established 
networks are not necessarily continued after funding has ended. 
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Abstract 
Subsidising research networks has become a popular instrument in 
technology policies, driven mainly by expected positive spillovers. In 
particular, the stimulation of R&D co-operation between scientific 
institutions and industry is considered as most promising. In the context 
of policy evaluation we analyse if public R&D funding is suitable for 
influencing firms’ collaborative behaviour in the intended way and 
where applicable, if a lasting change results. The empirical analysis is 
based on German CIS data and a supplemental telephone survey. Using 
a nearest-neighbour matching approach we find that R&D funding is 
indeed a particularly valuable tool for linking science into industry R&D 
partnerships. However, we also show in a bivariate probit analysis that 
newly initiated R&D co-operations with science are less likely to be 
continued after funding has ended compared to already existing co-
operations. Therefore, the behavioural change induced by public funding 
is not necessarily long-lived. 
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1   Introduction 
In today’s modern economies governments play a crucial role within the innovation 
system by setting regulations, establishing institutions, shaping capabilities and through direct 
support. In Germany as well as in other European countries the way in which public support 
has been granted to innovative projects by the firms has undergone a major change within the 
last two decades. While formerly mostly individual firms were publicly supported, from the 
1980s onwards, governments began to fund projects conducted by networks rather than 
individual firms. Germany has been no exception in this. Thus, governments are following the 
overall trend, by which R&D co-operations
2 have generally become important as a form of 
R&D organization. Today, the vast majority of publicly funded R&D projects are conducted 
via collaboration. Despite this development, there are only few empirical studies that analyse 
the link between public funding and collaboration. This is surprising, especially against the 
background of the growing evaluation literature on public R&D policies. The impetus behind 
the popularity of evaluation approaches is linked to growing expectations of achieving 
additional sustainable returns on public investments, denoted by the term ‘additionality’. 
However, most of the existing empirical literature on additionality focuses on changes in 
firms’ innovative input or output due to public funding, while a relatively new stream in the 
additionality concept focuses on changes in the firms’ behaviour.  
In the context of this new behavioural additionality concept, this study looks at the 
impact of public funding on the cooperative behaviour of firms. We therefore ask whether 
public R&D project funding is adequate for influencing firms’ co-operation practices in 
Germany. In particular, we investigate different types of collaborative research due to public 
R&D funding. The question on which we intend to shed light is whether public R&D funding 
stimulates firms to participate in new kinds of R&D co-operation, especially in co-operations 
with scientific institutions (science), which results in more diversified co-operation. 
Moreover, we examine if collaborations that were newly initiated within a publicly funded 
R&D project, i.e. cases where a company collaborated with the partner for the first time, are 
as likely to last, compared to already existing co-operations, after public funding has ended. If 
newly initiated co-operations are continued after the funded project has ended, a sustainable 
change in firms’ collaborative behaviour is achieved through public funding. In order to 
answer the questions we apply non-parametric and parametric estimation approaches, 
respectively. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2, first the theory 
underlying the motives for collaborative R&D and public funding and the related empirical 
literature are presented. Then the two hypotheses dealing with the impact of public support on 
the firms’ cooperative behaviour are outlined. The third section depicts the German Federal 
Government’s funding policy during the 1980s and 1990s. In the empirical section (section 4) 
we describe the data and the econometrics applied. This is followed by a presentation of the 
results in section 5. Finally, section six concludes. 
                                                           
2 The terms “collaboration”, “co-operation” and “partnership” are used interchangeably. 3 
2  Collaborative R&D and Public Funding 
In this chapter the rationales for collaborative R&D and its funding are explained and 
related empirical literature is presented. Moreover, the two research questions dealing with 
the impact of public support on the firms’ cooperative behaviour are outlined. At the end of 
this chapter the analysis is embedded in the behavioural additionality concept. 
Motives for R&D collaboration 
The number of R&D partnerships has increased considerably since the beginning of 
the 1980s and nowadays co-operation is a widely used form of organizing R&D (Hagedoorn 
2002). Several motives can be found in the literature for firms engaging in collaborative 
agreements both with other firms such as suppliers, customers or competitors and with 
universities and research institutes (an extensive overview can be found in Hagedoorn 1993 or 
Caloghirou et al. 2003).  
One motive is related to the nature of R&D. Starting with Arrow's (1962) work, 
economists have realised that investment in R&D differs substantially from other types of 
investment, e.g., in physical assets. R&D generates knowledge, which has characteristics 
typical of a public good (Coase 1974). Unlike investment in physical assets, returns on the 
creation of knowledge cannot be fully appropriated by the inventor and lead to information 
flows, called spillover. Firms try to achieve both a high level of knowledge flow into a firm 
and sufficiently protect internal knowledge from leaking out. The empirical study by 
Cassiman/Veugelers (2002) was the first which proved that “firms with higher incoming 
spillovers and better appropriation have a higher probability of cooperating in R&D” 
(Cassimen/Veugelers 2002: 1179). 
Besides the motives related to knowledge spillover, other factors influencing a firm’s 
decision to cooperate exist. One group of motives for co-operations is based on the objective 
to overcome resource constraints a firm faces. Most firms do not have all the necessary 
knowledge, capabilities, and financial means for realizing an innovation project. This hampers 
firms from undertaking this type of projects on their own. Thus, research partnerships are 
used in order to exploit unique capabilities, to combine competencies and to access 
complementary knowledge (see e.g. Hagedoorn 1993). Therefore, co-operations also might 
lead to a reduction of the time from product development to market introduction. Furthermore 
collaborative agreement might be established in order to share the involved cost and risk (see 
e.g. Sakakibara 1997). 
Furthermore, determinants related to firm characteristics are found to have an impact, 
e.g. structure of the firm and industry in which it operates, e.g. many empirical studies show 
that the probability of co-operation increases with firm size (see e.g. Röller et al. 2001). 
Rationales for public R&D funding 
The externalities of R&D lead to the problem that leaking knowledge increases social 
returns but reduces private returns. In the case that R&D generates higher social than private 
returns, the level of R&D activities in the economy in question is below the socially desirable 
level and market failure occurs (cf. Levin et al. 1987, Adams/Jaffe 1996). Since R&D is of 
great importance for the innovative potential and competitiveness of an economy, the 
government is keen to overcome the market failures related to the R&D investments of firms. 
Therefore, governments take action and use a variety of policies, so that technology gaps can 4 
be avoided and, in the end, national and European competitiveness is strengthened. The 
German government is among those taking such action (see e.g. Branscomb/Florida 1997, 
Martin/Scott 2000). 
At the end of the 1980s when R&D co-operation was seen as a useful form of R&D 
organization, the German government decided to reconfigure the incentive structure towards 
R&D collaborations. They wanted to phase out former policies which relied on project-
specific funding of single awardees and advance a collaboration-oriented policy scheme. In 
particular, R&D co-operation between industry and science should receive special emphasis. 
The argumentation behind funding collaborative R&D projects runs along the lines of 
spillovers and the desired know-how transfer: “Collaborative R&D intends to involve as 
many companies and scientific organisations as possible within a publicly funded project, to 
bundle individual resources and capabilities, to stimulate the technology transfer between 
industry and science, and to achieve synergies while funding should get less selective but 
more diffusive” (BMBF 1988, BTDrs 2005). The aim is to achieve a widespread efficiency of 
public R&D funds by stimulating “heterogeneous R&D collaborations e.g. between industry 
and science” (BTDrs 2005).  
Related empirical literature and results 
Several empirical studies dealing with motives to engage in R&D co-operations exist. 
But there are only a few studies which analyse the type of co-operation partner and control for 
the potential impact of public support. Belderbos et al. (2004) investigated the determinants of 
co-operations with competitors, suppliers, customers, and research institutes in the 
Netherlands. The subsidy dummy has a significantly positive effect on co-operations with 
supplier, customer and research institutions. But these effects become insignificant when only 
newly initiated co-operations are considered. Similar studies which used subsidy dummies are 
conducted by Dachs et al. (2004) and by Abramovsky et al. (2005). Dachs et al. investigated 
the co-operation pattern of Austrian and Finnish firms. In Finland national public support 
significantly increases the likelihood of cooperating with suppliers, competitors and research 
institutes. In Austria this effect is only found for co-operations with research institutes. 
Subsidies from the EU only have significantly positive effects on collaborative agreements 
with suppliers in Finland and customers and competitors in Austria. The study carried out by 
Abramovsky et al. focused on the choice of co-operation partners – vertical, horizontal, and 
research institutes - for firms in France, Germany, Spain and the UK. Including a public 
support dummy in their regressions, they found a significantly positive effect on all co-
operation partners in all four countries, except for cooperative agreements with competitors in 
the UK




                                                           
3 When four other explanatory variables are instrumented in the regression (Incoming spillovers, appropriability, 
R&D intensity and constraints), public support also becomes insignificant for cooperative agreements with 
competitors in Spain. 
4 Variables have a significant impact at least on the 5-%-level. 5 
But most of these studies do not correct for the selection bias regarding the 
participants and non-participants in public funding schemes. The only study we are aware of 
in which the endogeneity of public support due to the selection bias regarding the participants 
is taken into account is the one by Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2004). They focused in the 
analysis on the effect of government support on the decision to cooperate and chosen co-
operation partner for Catalan manufacturing firms. In order to correct for a potential 
endogeneity of program participation, they applied a matching approach. Distinguishing 
between co-operations with customers or suppliers, research institutes or universities and 
other organizations they found a significantly positive effect of subsidies on co-operations 
with all three types of partners. But the largest increase is found for the probability of co-
operating with public labs or universities. Public R&D program participation increases this 
type of partnership by 28%.  
Research Question I 
Based on the German government’s goal, our first hypothesis is that public R&D 
funding stimulates firms to seek new types of R&D partners, i.e., public funding is suitable 
for fostering a change in firms’ cooperative behaviour, towards a more diversified set of 
partners. For example, let’s say a company already cooperates in R&D with its suppliers and 
customers. We investigate if public funding supports these already existing instances of co-
operation or if collaborative R&D funding gives incentives for firms to get involved in new 
types of partnerships, in particular co-operations between firms and research institutions. For 
this purpose we compare the type of co-operation partners of subsidized and non-subsidized 
firms.  
Persistence of R&D collaboration 
A common theoretical basis underlying co-operation analyses is the transaction cost 
approach (Williamson 1975, 1985, Hennart 1988, Kogut 1988). Within the transaction cost 
theory each transaction is treated as discrete, i.e. independently from other transactions. Thus, 
most of the empirical studies dealing with co-operations treat a cooperative agreement 
between two partners as a singularity. As a consequence, there are few empirical works 
dealing with the continuation of R&D co-operations. However, the omission of the 
phenomenon of multiple co-operations with the same partner may neglect important impacts 
on the transaction costs associated with these further alliances (Gulati 1995). Most of these 
described possible impacts associated with the continuation of collaboration with a certain 
partner stem from the sociological literature.  
From a sociological point of view, the main motive which drives two 
individuals/institutions to collaborate in R&D is trust (Granovetter 2001). Trust can be 
defined as “an expression of confidence between the parties in an exchange of some kind – 
confidence that they will not be harmed or put at risk by actions of the other party” (Jones, 
George 1998: 531). A review of the literature shows that trust can lead not only to the creation 
of new collaborative agreements (McAllister 1995) but also serve as an explanation why 
collaborative agreements between partners get renewed or extended. The argumentation is as 
follows: If a firm enters a collaboration with other firms or other institutions more than once, 6 
the common experience from the first collaboration may have generated trust among the 
participating institutions and the trust created may limit transaction costs associated with 
further collaborations between the partners (Gulati 1995, Marsden 1981). For instance, the 
reduction of transaction costs thereby may occur in that sense that a more flexible and/or 
money saving governance structure can be found (Gulati 1995).  
Research Question II 
In order to fill the gap in the existing empirical literature, we examine firms’ 
characteristics in terms of the continuation of joint R&D once public funding has ended, that 
is, we test whether business or science collaborations newly initiated within a publicly funded 
R&D project are lasting (second hypothesis). The government’s expectation is that firms 
change their attitudes and behaviour by discovering valuable assets in R&D co-operation. 
Hence, companies overcome their prior reservations to partnering in their strategic field of 
R&D and maintain collaborative activities. Following our argumentation, trust may also play 
an important role in the continuation of collaboration by lowering the involved transaction 
costs. On the other hand, newly initiated co-operations might bear a higher risk of failure due 
to differing expectations regarding the project outcome or of the - previously unknown - 
project partner. In order to evaluate the proportion of co-operations which were newly 
initiated and continued after funding had ended, we compare these with the continuation of 
already existing co-operations. If the funding has a longer term effect, the newly initiated co-
operations should have at least the same probability of being continued after funding ends 
compared to co-operations which already existed before funding.  
Embedding the analysis in the concept of behaviour additionality 
This study focuses on firms’ behaviour regarding co-operations in publicly funded 
R&D projects. We ask whether public R&D funding is adequate for influencing firms’ 
collaborative behaviour, both immediately and in the short or medium term. We thus link co-
operation into the concept of behavioural additionality which was first introduced by 
Buisseret et al. (1995). They broadened the traditional additionality approach/view, consisting 
of input and output additionality.
5 This new concept can be defined as “the change in a 
company’s way of undertaking R&D which can be attributed to policy actions” (Buisseret et 
al. 1995: 590). One specific aspect of firms’ R&D behaviour is the firms’ collaborative R&D 
activities. A firm decides whether to cooperate in R&D at all, and if so, with which type of 
partner and whether to continue the collaboration. The collaboration strategy is potentially 
influenced by public funding. Firms might be encouraged by public funding to extend their 
already existing co-operations or to enter co-operations with new (types of) partners. Most of 
the empirical evaluation studies to date focus on input and output additionalities and neglect 
                                                           
5 Input additionality looks at a firm’s inputs, e.g. private R&D investments and analyses whether public R&D 
grants (partly) substitute or complement private R&D investment. The concept of output additionality focuses on 
changes in the ‘output’ of the firm’s innovation process, like new products or patents, after carrying out publicly 
and privately co-financed R&D. For an overview of conducted studies see Aerts et al. (2007). 7 
behavioural changes in general and also with respect to collaborative aspects due to public 
funding.
6  
3  Public R&D project funding in Germany 
Direct R&D project funding has become a popular instrument in technology policies 
in Germany, from the 1980s on. It is characterised by the funding of a concrete field of 
technology on a cost-sharing basis. In principle, such business R&D project funding is 
available to all domestic firms. However, each public R&D programme has specific 
characteristics, such as different application procedures, different requirements and different 
agencies which are responsible for funding proceedings.  
While in the 1980s, about 1,600 projects per year were funded within this funding 
scheme, the number steadily increased to over 4,000 projects in 2004.7 The total R&D budget 
and therefore the average award size have been decreasing at the same time. The average total 
awarded to private firms decreased compared to 1980 by almost 10 percent to about 363 
millions euros in 2004. Nevertheless, given the amounts distributed with means of this 
programme, it is still one most important tool for subsidies for the business sector. 
Furthermore, the government announced in their High-Tech-Strategy an increase of the 
budget in the next years again (BMBF 2006).  
At the end of the 1980s, the BMBF began to emphasise the funding of projects 
conducted by networks rather than individual companies. While in the 1980s about 72 per 
cent of all funded projects in the business sector were individual R&D projects, the opposite 
was true by the beginning of 2000, with a proportion of 81 per cent of projects conducted on a 
collaborative basis. In 2004, about 87 per cent of all publicly funded projects of the business 
sector are collaborative R&D projects and these receive 78 per cent of the funding budget. 
These joint research activities where business companies are involved are carried out by an 
average of three partners, such as other business firms or scientific institutions.  
The BMBF did not only intend to emphasize collaborative R&D in general, but they 
wanted to fund more diversified co-operations with respect to the type of participating 
partners. Figure 1 graphs all directly subsidized R&D projects, not restricted to the business 
sector, according to whether they are part of a network and, if so, which kinds of partners are 
involved.8  
                                                           
6 Falk (2004) also used an econometric approach in order to investigate behavioural additionality aspects but her 
focus is on the impact of subsidies on the innovation capabilities and competence measured by R&D personnel. 
Other studies dealing with the measurement of behavioural additionality can be found in OECD (2006). 
7 Contract research and projects which receive 100 per cent funding are not included in these numbers. 
8 Firms are differentiated between business sector, science sector, like universities or research institutions, and 
other institutions (“others”), e.g. federal state ministries, municipal authorities, or chambers of commerce. 8 
Figure 1: Direct R&D project funding by BMBF in Germany 





































Collab. Conducted Projects: Business - Science
Collab. Conducted Projects: Science
Collab. Conducted Projects: Business
Collab. Conducted Projects: Others
 
Source: Calculation by ZEW based on the German Federal Government’s database PROFI (2005)
9 
Looking at all directly funded projects the clear trend towards collaborative projects 
remains. In 2004 two-thirds of the projects were part of a network. The increase thereby 
applies to all types of collaborations, i.e., any combination of business networks and research 
institutes/universities, but it is by far the largest for networks of business companies and 
scientific institutions. Most of the collaborative projects in which business companies take 
part also involve scientific institutions. Hence, the government implemented its plan to shift 
funding towards diversified co-operations.  
4  Empirical model, data and descriptive statistics 
4.1  Methodology 
In this section, microeconometric analyses of firms’ collaborative behaviour are 
conducted in order to investigate (a) whether public R&D funding is suitable for fostering a 
change of firms’ usual R&D partnerships and (b) whether newly initiated collaborations 
within a publicly funded R&D project are continued even if public funding has ended. 
 
 
                                                           
9 Numbers are not restricted to the business sector. The eye-catching peak in the number of individually 
conducted projects between 1985 and 1987 is due to the funding program for improving vocational training for 
disadvantaged young persons.  9 
(a) Changes of firms’ R&D partnerships due to public funding 
To examine the first effect, i.e. the involvement of new types of partners in 
cooperative activities due to public funding, we will compare two groups of firms that 
collaborate in R&D. We distinguish firms without public funding from those which receive 
funds and investigate their R&D partnerships. In accordance with a distinction in the German 
public funding procedures we analyse firms by R&D collaborations with (i) other businesses 
only, (ii) with scientific institutions (“science”) only and (iii) by their involvement of a 
combination of both business and science. Policymakers aim to induce changes in 
collaborative behaviour through public funding. Explicitly, public funding is expected to 
provide a stimulus, increasing the probability of R&D co-operation in new and more 
heterogeneous R&D combinations: companies which have previously cooperated solely in 
R&D with other firms, e.g., clients and/or suppliers, should gain incentives for involvement in 
more heterogeneous partnerships, i.e. co-operations with both other businesses and science. 
Germany’s public funding schemes favour collaborative research projects in general but do 
not predetermine the type of partner. Since public R&D funding is a cost-sharing approach it 
reduces firms’ R&D costs. But we must questioned whether a significant change in the 
collaborative behaviour towards more heterogeneous kinds of partnerships is induced. 
In order to correct for a possible selection bias, which occurs when participants in 
public schemes differ from non-participants in important characteristics, we apply a non-
parametric matching procedure (cf. Heckman et al. 1999).
10 With this approach we directly 
address the question, "With which set of partners would a funded firm with a given set of 
characteristics have cooperated, if it hadn’t had a funded project?” The participation in a 
publicly funded R&D project is also called treatment. We investigate the potential change of 
collaborative behaviour that may arise from public funding. Our sample exclusively contains 
R&D collaborating firms, for which we are able to distinguish whether they are subsidised or 
not subsidised. The matching estimator balances the sample individually for each observation 
with respect to the variables included in the matching procedure. The fundamental evaluation 
question can be illustrated by an equation describing the average treatment effect of treatment 
on the treated (ATT): 
  () ( ) |1 |1 == −=
TC ATT E Y S E Y S , 
where  Y
T is the outcome variable, that indicates with which partner(s) the firm 
cooperates, namely, only with other businesses, only with science or with both types. The 
status S refers to the group: S=1 is the treatment group (subsidised firms) and S=0 the non-
treated firms (non-subsidised firms). Y
C is the potential outcome which would have been 
realised if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. The problem is obvious: While the 
outcome of the treated firms in case of treatment, E(Y
T|S=1), is directly observable, this is not 
the case for the second term on the right side of the equation. With whom would these firms 
have collaborated if they had not received the treatment, i.e. the public funding? E(Y
C|S=1) is 
a counterfactual situation which is not observable and, therefore, has to be estimated. In the 
case of matching, this potential outcome is constructed from a control group of non-
participants (collaborating and not publicly funded firms). The matching relies on the 
                                                           
10 Other studies applying the non-parametric matching approach are e.g. Duguet (2004), Czarnitzki/Fier (2002) 
or Winterhager et al. (2006). 10 
intuitively attractive idea of balancing the sample of program participants with comparable 
non-participants. Remaining differences in the outcome variables, namely the sets of co-
operation partners, between both groups are then attributed to the treatment, i.e. the public 
direct R&D project funding (Heckman et al. 1997). 
In order that the ATT can be identified two assumptions have to hold: the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA) and common support. The CIA implies that all the 
characteristics which influence both treatment and outcome have to be observed. Common 
support requires that for each treated observation a similar control can be found. 
(b) Continuation of firms’ new R&D partnerships even if public funding ends 
What happens with an R&D partnership when public funding ends? The predominant 
question is whether the partners continue to collaborate or if the established network 
dissolves. In attempting to answer this, we pay special attention to newly initiated 
collaborations in order to evaluate if public funding has a longer term effect on the co-
operation behaviour. Does co-operation that was established for the funded project last after 
public funding has ended? Collaboration need not be restricted to the funded project period; 
instead, companies could continue joint activity, e.g., in the same or another project. They 
might especially decide to do so in cases where the companies considered the funding and co-
operation as valuable (Hypothesis 1).  
A proportion of the funded projects are continued after funding has ended. In order to 
evaluate this proportion we compare the newly initiated co-operations, which represent a 
behavioural change due to the funding, with those that already existed. Due to potential 
heterogeneity among firms, technologies or funds, we apply a multivariate approach, namely 
a bivariate probit model
11, to test the hypothesis. This enables us to control for effects of 
several variables in our analysis. Accordingly, we simultaneously estimate the likelihood of 
the continuation of co-operation with science and co-operation with business. On the basis of 
the estimation results we check whether the variable for the newly initiated co-operation has a 
significant impact on the continuation of the R&D partnerships (Hypothesis 2).  
4.2  Data and telephone survey 
The company data used in the following empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP), the German Federal Government's direct R&D funding database 
(PROFI), the German Patent Office database (DPMA) and Computer Aided Telephone 
Interview (CATI) data. 
In an initial step we use data on the manufacturing sector from the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the BMBF since 1993. The 2001 survey represents 
the German part of the third Community Innovation Survey. We use the 2001 and 2004 waves 
of the MIP as they are the only ones to contain data on R&D co-operations and funding. This 
means the survey information corresponds to the years 2000 and 2003 or to the period 1998-
2000 and 2001-2003, depending on the specific variable. Because the analysis deals with 
behavioural changes concerning R&D co-operation, we only use firms which maintain R&D 
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co-operation. The question on co-operation relates to the preceding three year period. On top 
of that, the firms have to name the type of their co-operation partners. Since only the 
innovative firms were asked the questions on co-operation our sample is restricted to firms 
with innovative activities. We limited our sample to companies with less than 5,000 
employees.
12 In a second step, we merge this firm level data with the Federal Government's 
R&D funding database (PROFI). This database contains all federal civilian direct R&D 
funding activities carried out in Germany by the BMBF or its former ministries since the 
1970s. In a third step, we extract information on patents from the German Patent Office 
(DPMA) database which covers patenting activities in Germany since 1980. As both the 
DPMA and the PROFI databases are census data, our sample is determined by the MIP. In the 
end, we have 659 German firms to be used for the estimations. 
In addition, data from the telephone survey on behavioural patterns were used. For the 
survey, cases from the PROFI database where the publicly funded R&D projects expired 
between 2002 and 2004 were selected. This time period guarantees a higher probability of 
contacting the responsible R&D managers involved in the R&D funding and implementation 
process. The telephone interview was structured in four different thematic fields related to the 
dimensions of behavioural additionality.
13 For the behavioural assessment of the impact of 
publicly funded R&D projects on collaborations, the interviewees were asked about their 
status of co-operation with respect to public funding. The telephone survey was conducted 
with the CATI system because of its high flexibility in reporting interviews and its higher 
response rates compared to mail surveys. Finally, we collected a pool of 1,891 unique 
companies, of which 524 were selected randomly to be surveyed. Every selected company 
was called on average 2.6 times for different reasons, such as the responsible R&D project 
manager being unavailable. In summary, 39 per cent of the R&D managers contacted 
participated in the survey and a full set of data is available for 142 firms. 
4.3  Variables and descriptive statistics 
On the basis of the MIP data, 659 collaborative R&D performers are identified. We 
differentiate between three kinds of R&D partnerships on the basis of the type of co-
operation, to examine our first hypothesis:  
(i)  Business-Business co-operation (BCOP): a firm collaborates only with other 
businesses,  
(ii)  Business-Science co-operation (SCOP): a firm collaborates only with scientific 
institutions,  
(iii)  Business-Science & Business co-operation (SBCOP): a firm collaborates with other 
businesses and scientific institutions.  
                                                           
12 As the matching relies on the idea of comparing similar observations, we decided to restrict the sample to 
companies with less than 5,000 employees because it is not very meaningful to look for similar firms when they 
are larger than this threshold. 
13 (I) Significance and contribution of the respective publicly funded R&D project; (II) Impact of the publicly 
funded R&D project on collaborations; (III) General strategies underlying the acquisition and conduct of firms’ 
R&D projects, and (IV) General questions about R&D activities in the considered firm. See Fier et al. (2005) for 
further details on the questionnaire. 12 
The descriptive statistics for the firms show that the majority (57%) of these 
companies participate in diversified co-operations, i.e. the business-science & business 
(SBCOP) co-operation (Table 2). About 24 per cent of all firms only cooperate with science 
(SCOP) and about 19 per cent have partnerships only with business (BCOP). Furthermore, we 
distinguish the collaborating firms into recipients of public R&D funds (during the preceding 
three year period) and companies who cooperate in R&D without public funding. 
Collaborating recipients of public R&D funding are labelled using a dummy variable 
(FUND). In our sample most companies have been publicly funded by the Federal State 
within programmes or initiatives (63 %). If we just focus on these publicly funded R&D 
collaborating firms, we observe a slightly higher tendency in the heterogeneous SBCOP: 65 
per cent of these firms have R&D co-operations with science and industry, 27 per cent 
cooperate only with science and eight per cent of all firms only have business R&D 
partnerships. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the German Survey (659 observations) 
Variables     Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
FUND  Recipients of public R&D funding  FUND=1  0.625  0.484  0  1 
BCOP  R&D collaboration only with other business  BCOP=1  0.188  0.391  0  1 
SCOP  R&D collaboration only with science SBCOP=1  0.238  0.426  0  1 
SBCOP  R&D collaboration with science and other business  SBCOP=1  0.573  0.495  0  1 
ln(TURN)  Log of turnover    2.945  1.967  -2.973  7.616 
ln(AGE)  Log of firm’s age    2.947  1.043  0  5.425 
EXINT  Export intensity    0.334  0.262  0  1 
RDNO  No R&D activities  RDNO=1  0.049  0.215  0  1 
RDOC  Occasional R&D activities  RDOC=1  0.158  0.365  0  1 
RDRE  Regular R&D activities  RDRE=1  0.793  0.405  0  1 
PATDL  Patent dummy (lagged variable) PATDL=1  0.200  0.401  0  1 
EAST  Eastern Germany  EAST=1  0.319  0.466  0  1 
YR  Year 2003 (base year: 2000)  YR=1  0.581  0.494  0  1 
IND1  NACE Codes: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 40, 41, 45  IND1=1  0.085  0.280  0  1 
IND2  NACE Codes: 15, 61, 17 ,18, 19  IND2=1  0.039  0.195  0  1 
IND3  NACE Codes: 20, 21, 22, 36, 37  IND3=1  0.044  0.205  0  1 
IND4  NACE Codes: 23, 24, 25  IND4=1  0.159  0.365  0  1 
IND5  NACE Codes: 27, 28, 29, 34, 35  IND5=1  0.382  0.486  0  1 
IND6  NACE Codes: 30, 31, 32  IND6=1  0.112  0.316  0  1 
IND7  NACE Codes: 33  IND7=1  0.179  0.384  0  1 
SCOPC*  R&D collaboration with science continued SCOPC=1  0.718  0.451  0  1 
BCOPC*  R&D collaboration with business continued BCOPC=1  0.746  0.437  0  1 
SCOPI*  R&D collaboration with science new initiated  SCOPI=1  0.430  0.497  0  1 
BCOPI*  R&D collaboration with business new initiated  BCOPI=1  0.634  0.483  0  1 
BEGIN*  Accelerated beginning of project  BEGIN=1  0.542  0.500  0  1 
EXT*  Extended project scope  EXT=1  0.556  0.499  0  1 
ln(GRANT)*  Log of funding amount      11.990  0.930  9.358  14.803 
ln(TURN)*  Log of turnover    1.558  2.048  -2.017  7.093 
EAST*  Eastern Germany   EAST=1  0.394  0.490  0  1 
SERVICE*  Service sector  SERVICE=1 0.338 0.475  0  1 
TEC1*  Environment; Energy; Transportation  TEC1=1  0.268  0.444  0  1 
TEC2*  Materials TEC2=1  0.155  0.363  0  1 
TEC3*  Life Science  TEC3=1  0.077  0.268  0  1 
TEC4*  ICT TEC4=1  0.338  0.475  0  1 
TEC5*  Cross-Sectoral Activities; Education/Science TEC5=1  0.162  0.370  0  1 
Note:  *N=142 collaborating & publicly funded firms involved in the CATI survey  
Source:  ZEW Databases (2005) 
In the analysis we include several characteristics of R&D collaborating firms as 
exogenous variables. Since larger companies have a higher probability of co-operating in 
general and therefore tend to have more experience of co-operation, it is probable that they 13 
already maintain or have previously maintained co-operations with their possible partners 
(Fritsch/Lukas 2001). For this reason, we control for firm size in terms of the log of turnover, 
whereby turnover is measured in millions of euros (TURN). Firm’s experiences on markets 
and with competitors are controlled by their age (AGE, in logarithm). Companies differing in 
the regularity of their R&D activities might be heterogeneous with respect to their R&D 
organisation and thus might select a different set of partners. In order to capture this, we use 
three dummy variables: measuring whether firms exhibit no (RDNO), occasional (RDOC) or 
regular R&D (RDRE) activities. Regular R&D activities of firms might have a different 
influence on their choice of the co-operation partner.
14 RDNO serves as base category. 
Further variables are used to control for intellectual property rights and firms’ experiences in 
foreign markets. A lagged patent dummy (PATDL) is used to capture a firm’s appropriability 
capabilities and the export intensity (EXINT) indicates the degree of foreign sales. The lagged 
patent dummy variable represents the firm’s ability to appropriate the gains from conducted 
R&D, insufficient protection mechanisms for their own R&D results might prevent the firms 
from performing joint research with other businesses, in particular with competitors 
(Katz/Ordover 1990). We include the export intensity results due to the fact that firms who 
face international competition are more likely to conduct R&D and thus participate in specific 
R&D partnerships. All regressions include a dummy which denotes eastern German firms, as 
they may face different conditions due to the ongoing transformation process of the eastern 
German economy (EAST). We also include a dummy variable indicating the year of 
observation (YR2003; base year: 2000) and industry variables (IND1-IND7)
15 to take into 
account distinctive features in different industries. 
Within the CATI survey, 142 publicly funded R&D collaborating firms reported on 
internal R&D activities, explained the effects of the participation in public R&D programmes 
and gave more information about their collaborations. The telephone survey makes additional 
information available to complement the MIP survey data. This information is used to test the 
second hypothesis, whether newly initiated business or science collaborations within a 
publicly funded R&D project are continued after the funding ends. The continuation of 
collaboration need not be restricted to the funded project. The companies could also continue 
joint activity in another project. We distinguish two kinds of partnerships which continued 
after funding ended: 
(i)  Business-Business co-operation continued (BCOPC): a firm’s R&D collaboration with 
other businesses continues after the funding period has ended, 
(ii)  Business-Science co-operation continued (SCOPC): a firm’s R&D collaboration with 
science continues after the funding period has ended. 
Overall, almost 75 per cent of the co-operations are continued after the funding has 
ended. For firms which initiate new co-operation with business or science in the publicly 
funded R&D project, the dummy variables BCOPI and SCOPI are generated. Looking at the 
newly initiated co-operations with other businesses, 72 per cent of these were continued after 
funding had ended. In comparison, this percentage equals 79 if the collaborations that already 
                                                           
14 Cassiman/Veugelers (2002) found a positive effect of permanent R&D on co-operation with suppliers and 
customers, and a negative one on co-operations with research institutions, although both effects are not 
significant. 
15 The overview of the aggregated industries is shown in the appendix, Table 5. 14 
existed are considered. This difference increases for co-operations with scientific institutions. 
Only 54 per cent of newly initiated collaborations are continued, compared to 85 per cent of 
those already established. If the funding has a longer term effect on collaboration, the newly 
initiated co-operations should have a higher or at least the same probability of being 
continued after funding ends compared to co-operations which already existed before funding, 
while controlling for other factors. Furthermore, we include two dummy variables in order to 
measure the effect of the funding which might be also linked to co-operation in general. The 
dummy variable BEGIN indicates whether the funding of an R&D project accelerated the 
beginning of the project. An extended project scope due to funding is captured by the dummy 
variable EXT. Both are expected to have a positive impact on the decision to continue co-
operation. The scope of the funded collaboration project, measured by the total amount of  
subsidies received for the project (GRANT, in millions of euros), may have an impact on 
these decisions. We capture impacts specific to a particular funding area by including five 
technology dummies (TEC1-TEC5).
16 The reference category consists of projects belonging 
to cross-sectoral activities or education/science (TEC5). Moreover, firm-specific 
characteristics are included. We control for the size of the firm with the logarithm of turnover 
(TURN). Firms which are active in the service sector are labelled by the dummy variable 
SERVICE. The base category is the manufacturing sector. We include the dummy EAST to 
indicate that the location of the firm is in eastern Germany.  
5  Empirical results 
(a) Changes of firms’ R&D partnerships due to public funding 
We perform a matching estimation to correct for a possible selection bias comparing 
publicly funded R&D collaborating companies and those not publicly funded. We investigate 
whether non-publicly funded firms collaborate in R&D with a different set of partners (firms 
from business, science or both) compared to the counterfactual situation, i.e., to the situation 
if these firms had been publicly funded.  
Given the broad range of variables in our dataset we are confident that we have 
enough information on the firms to sufficiently approximate the decision-making process 
regarding the funding (treatment) and co-operation partner (outcome) so that the CIA holds.  
Before proceeding the actual matching, a probit model on the probability of receiving 
funding (FUND) was estimated.
17 The results show that the size of the firm has an inverted U-
shaped impact. The probability of a firm being publicly funded is higher if R&D activities are 
carried out regularly or occasionally. Firms which already had patents in the previous year 
have a higher probability of participation. Regarding the export behaviour no effect is found. 
A selectivity of funding towards younger firms is detected. Firms based in eastern Germany 
have a higher probability of receiving funds than those located in the western part.  
                                                           
16 The funding areas are aggregated as follows: environment/energy, materials; life science, cross-sectoral 
activities/education/science. The detailed aggregation can be seen in the appendix, Table 6. 
17 The results of the probit estimation can be found in the appendix, Table 7. The matching procedure is 
described in detail, e.g., by Czarnitzki /Fier (2002).  15 
The propensity score of this estimation is labelled PSCORE. In order to find a control 
observation for each treated firm, the nearest neighbour approach with replacement based on 
the Mahalanobis distance is applied. Besides PSCORE the Mahalanobis metric restriction is 
defined by size (TURN), the lagged patent application dummy (PATDL), the regularity of 
R&D activities (RDNO, RDOC, RDRE), the age (ln(AGE)), industry group dummies (IND1-
IND7), and the region (EAST).  
To ensure that common support for the treated firms is fulfilled in the matching, 13 
treated observations had to be dropped, representing three per cent of all funded firms. But by 
means of a t-Test it can be shown that this drop does not lead to any significant change in the 
means of the considered variables. Therefore, the loss of the 13 observations can be neglected. 
In order to evaluate the quality of the matching we re-estimate the propensity score by 
using only the matched sample and taking account of replacement in the control group by 
weighting. As stated by Sianesi (2004) the pseudo-R2 after matching should be quite low 
because there should be no more systematic differences in the regressors between treated and 
control companies. In our setting, the Pseudo-R2 after the re-estimation is fairly low and 
equals 0.0173. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio suggests that there is no joint significance of all 
covariates of the probit model after matching.   
Table 3 illustrates the differences between the two groups, R&D collaborating and 
publicly funded firms as the treatment group and R&D collaborating but not publicly funded 
firms as the control group, showing the considered characteristics and the outcome variables 
before and after matching.  
Looking at the t-Test conducted prior to the matching procedure, the distribution of 
several variables differs between the funded firms and the matched control group. However, 
the matching estimator is successful in balancing out these differences. After matching, these 
differences vanish. Hence, it is possible to estimate the causal effect of public funding on the 
recipients.  
On the question of how publicly funded firms on average would have behaved if they 
had not been publicly funded, we find that R&D funding is, in particular, a tool that 
stimulates the inclusion of science in R&D partnerships. The proportion of companies which 
cooperate in R&D solely with industry, such as clients and/or suppliers (BCOP), is fairly low 
for funded firms. As a result of public funding, firms change their R&D strategy, moving 
away from only business-to-business co-operation: Only 8 per cent of the funded firms 
cooperate in purely business-to-business relationships, while 36 per cent of firms would have 
chosen this partnership if they did not receive public funds.  
Firms which exclusively cooperate in R&D with science show a significant increase in 
their co-operation behaviour due to public funding (SCOP): 26 per cent of publicly funded 
firms cooperate solely with science and this share would have been lowered to 15 per cent if 
public funding had not taken place. But the highest rise is observed for the formation of more 
heterogeneous co-operations. The results show that 50 per cent of the publicly funded firms 
would have cooperated in R&D with science and industry if public funding had not taken 
place. This share increased up to 66 per cent due to funding.  16 
Table 3: Matching results on R&D collaborating firms (399 matched pairs) 
   Mean 
Variable 
a)  Sample 
publicly funded  not publicly funded 
p-value of two sided 
t-test 
b) 
FUND  Before matching  1  0   
  After matching  1  0   
PSCORE  Before matching  0.703  0.498  0.000 
  After matching  0.694  0.662  0.220 
ln(TURN)  Before matching  2.641  3.451  0.000 
  After matching  2.753  2.770  0.947 
ln(AGE)  Before matching  2.753  3.272  0.000 
  After matching  2.777  2.955  0.185 
EXINT  Before matching  0.331  0.340  0.688 
  After matching  0.335  0.337  0.940 
RDNO  Before matching  0.019  0.097  0.000 
  After matching  0.020  0.020  1.000 
RDOC  Before matching  0.124  0.215  0.002 
  After matching  0.129  0.129  1.000 
RDRE  Before matching  0.857  0.688  0.000 
  After matching  0.852  0.852  1.000 
PATDL  Before matching  0.206  0.190  0.619 
  After matching  0.211  0.180  0.593 
EAST  Before matching  0.422  0.146  0.000 
  After matching  0.404  0.323  0.240 
BCOP  Before matching  0.083  0.364  0.000 
  After matching  0.080  0.356  0.000 
SCOP  Before matching  0.267  0.190  0.025 
  After matching  0.263  0.148  0.030 
SBCOP  Before matching  0.650  0.445  0.000 
  After matching  0.657  0.496  0.026 
a) Eight industry dummies and a dummy variable indicating the year of the survey are not reported. But after matching the 
respective means are not significantly different. 
b) After matching, standard errors of t-statistics for two sided t-test on mean equality are based on the approximation by 
Lechner (2001) which accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
Note: 13 treated observations had to be dropped due to common support. 
Overall, we find evidence that public funding has a significant influence on the 
selection of collaboration partners. Instead of business-to-business R&D partnerships, 
collaborating firms decide in favour of science-business and science only partnerships due to 
public funding, i.e., they involve science partners as new members in their R&D 
collaborations. In the vast majority of cases, heterogeneous R&D networks, i.e. co-operations 
with both other businesses and science, are established. This result is similar to the finding of 
Busom/Fernández-Ribas (2004) who showed that participation in a subsidy program has the 
largest positive effects on the probability of co-operating with universities or public labs.
18  
Since in our study the treatment group is larger than the control group, we also 
estimate the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) in order to validate the results:
19 
the effect of public funding in terms of the co-operation partner for the non-funded firms. The 
estimates of ATU are in line with the ATT and suggest that the share of co-operations with 
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difference between subsidized and non-subsidized firms for the likelihood to cooperate with a certain type of 
partner, a more detailed comparison is not possible. 
19 More detailed information on the calculation of the ATU can be found in Fier et al. (2005). 17 
other businesses only would decrease markedly and instead, diversified co-operations would 
be favoured (cf. Table 8 in appendix). 
One potential shortcoming of this analysis might be that we are not able to control for 
co-operations that existed prior to the point of time when the firms applied for public funds. 
This is due to data restrictions. However, Feldman/Kelley (2001) found in their study that 
ATP award-winning companies are already better linked to other business at the time of 
applying for an award than those not awarded. But no significant difference was found for 
links with research institutions between the two groups. There is no comparable study or 
result for Germany. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that the results might be 
overestimated.  
 (b) Continuation of firms’ new R&D partnerships after public funding has ended 
We investigate collaboration behaviour when public funding has ended. This analysis 
is based on the group of publicly funded and R&D collaborating companies which 
participated in the CATI survey. In order to test which determinants influence the probability 
of continuing collaborations when the public R&D project funding has ended, we distinguish 
between co-operations with science and business. In the bivariate probit model the 
endogenous variables are dummy variables indicating whether the collaboration with science 
(SCOPC) and the collaboration with business (BCOPC) were continued. Table 4 shows the 
results of the regression model.  
The results show that the likelihood of continuing the corresponding collaboration is 
higher if the companies gain specific experiences through the funding. Some firms broadened 
their initial research spectrum due to public funding (EXT). This extension of the R&D 
project volume has a positive influence on the continuation of collaborations with science. A 
positive effect of the extension of the project volume does not apply to co-operation with 
business. Due to the funding, about half of the firms were able to expedite the beginning of 
the project since potential financial gaps and negotiations were reduced. With regard to 
business-business co-operations, a faster initial project start (BEGIN) increases the likelihood 
of continuing the collaboration with business partners. This observation could be explained by 
the fact that firms were able to realise a comparative advantage over competitors because of 
the earlier project start. In order to maintain this advantage, the business-business partnership 
is more likely to be continued.  
We find that the total amount of R&D funds awarded (ln(GRANT)) has a significantly 
positive effect on the probability of continuing collaboration with scientific institutions. 
Large-scale R&D project grants tend to be more complex, which has two effects. Firstly, it is 
sometimes not possible to keep to the scheduled end-date and the collaborative project has to 
be continued. Secondly, additional research topics emerge due to the complexity, as argued 
above. The funding volume does not have an influence on continuing business-business 
collaboration after the funding has ended. 
A firm’s location in eastern Germany has a positive effect on the continuation of 
collaboration with science. Other firm characteristics like size (ln(TURN)) or belonging to the 
service sector (SERVICE) do not affect the probability of continuation of any type of co-
operation. Overall, it seems that firm characteristics do not play a crucial role for the 
continuation of collaboration, only for the decision to cooperate at all and with whom.  18 
Table 4: Bivariate probit estimation results on continued collaborations 
  Collaboration with science continued 
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RHO  0.593 ***  (0.132)        
Number of obs.   142 
Note:  Significant at the 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**), 10%-level (*) 
  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented. 
Marginal effect (at the sample means) for the probability of continuing the collaborations with science, 
unconditional on the continuance of collaboration with industry; and vice versa. For dummy variables, 
the marginal effect represents the discrete change from 0 to 1. 
As seen in the descriptive statistics, a proportion of the newly initiated co-operations 
are continued after funding has ended. In order to evaluate the significance of these continued 
co-operations we compare these with the already existing co-operations and check if a newly 
initiated co-operation is at least as likely to be continued as a funded co-operation which 
already existed before funding, while controlling for other factors which might influence the 
decision whether to continue a collaboration. Regarding hypothesis two, we find that co-
operations with scientific institutions which were newly initiated for the funded project are 
less likely to be continued after funding has ended than co-operations which already existed 
prior to the funded project (SCOPI). The probability of continuation with science decreases 
by approximately 34 percentage points if the co-operation is newly initiated. Long-term 
partnerships might mean co-operation on a more trustful basis, not involving such high risks 
as co-operation with new partners. This, in turn, may make continuation more plausible. A 
newly initiated co-operation may not be able to achieve or outweigh this effect. Overall, 19 
public funding tends to integrate science into business R&D partnerships, but the newly 
established networks are not necessarily lasting after funding has ended. 
While newly initiated co-operations have a highly significantly negative effect on the 
continuation of co-operations with science, their effect on the continuation of co-operation 
with business (BCOPI) is weakly significant and the corresponding change in probability is 
much smaller. The probability of continuation with industry decreases by 6 percentage points 
if the co-operation is newly initiated.
20 For the continuation of a co-operation with other 
businesses it does not matter significantly whether it was newly initiated for the project or 
whether it already existed before funding began. If the government achieves its aim of 
assuring that a new co-operation with another business is established for the funded project, 
the probability of continuing this co-operation is almost as high as it is for already existing 
ones. Therefore, the funding has a longer term effect in this respect. 
A shortcoming in this analysis might be that we do not have information on whether 
the co-operations receive further subsidies, because receiving funds and the continuation of 
co-operation might be correlated. In the database comprising all projects funded under the 
direct R&D project funding scheme, we checked whether the co-operation partner received 
further funding within this scheme. A rather low share of co-operations received further 
funding. 10 co-operations with other firms and 15 with research institutes received subsidies 
for projects beginning in the year when the examined project ended or in the subsequent year. 
We also tried to distinguish in the estimation between co-operations which received further 
funding and those which did not, but we did not find any significant results. This might be 
due to the low number of observations. Therefore, this omission might not be severe. 
6  Conclusions 
Public funding of R&D activities has become an integral function of innovation 
policies in many OECD countries. From a scientist’s as well as a policy maker’s point of 
view, understanding the mechanisms and impacts associated with these public interventions is 
of particular importance. Its increasing relevance can be ascribed to decreasing government 
budgets and the necessity to design policy measures more efficiently. In Germany, direct 
R&D project funding is an important funding tool used by the government. Since the end of 
the 1980s a clear trend towards the funding of projects conducted in networks rather than 
individual companies has emerged. In 2004 two-thirds of all directly funded projects were 
part of a collaborative network.  
This research study focuses on firms’ behaviour regarding co-operations in publicly 
funded R&D projects. We ask whether public R&D funding is adequate for influencing firms’ 
collaborative behaviour. More precisely, we investigate (i) whether public R&D funding 
stimulates firms to participate in new kinds of R&D co-operation (with business firms only, 
with science only or both) and (ii) whether newly initiated collaborations within a publicly 
funded R&D project are at least as likely to last as already existing co-operations, after public 
funding has ended. Our research is based on different databases and a telephone survey. For 
                                                           
20 The marginal effect of SCOPI is significant on the 10% level. Looking at the coefficient of SCOPI, the 
significance vanishes. 20 
the first research question the sample consists of observations for 659 collaborating German 
firms, for the second question we have 142 observations.  
Overall, the results of our analyses vary depending on the type of co-operation partner. 
Public funding is successful in integrating scientific institutions as a new type of partner in 
co-operations. Funded companies have more diversified co-operation networks. Publicly 
funded collaborative R&D is suitable for changing co-operative behaviour: Firms which had 
exclusively cooperated with other business companies tend to  involve science as a new 
partner in their R&D activities due to the funding. Hence, public funding achieves its aim of 
broadening R&D networks, in line with the government’s expectation of strengthening 
spillovers and innovativeness. 
Regarding the longer term, a proportion of the funded projects last after funding has 
ended. In order to evaluate this proportion we compare the newly initiated co-operations with 
those that already existed. The newly initiated co-operations with science have a higher 
probability of being broken up again after funding has ended compared to co-operations with 
science which already existed before funding was introduced. Hence, this change in firms’ co-
operation behaviour is more short-lived. On the other hand, the newly initiated co-operations 
with business, which might not be seen as a behavioural change in a firm’s co-operation 
strategy since it is not a new type of partner, have a longer term effect. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that they have at least the same probability of being continued as already existing 
business co-operations.  
A proportion of co-operations which were newly initiated with science are continued 
but the question is if this proportion is high enough to satisfy the government. If we compare 
the proportion with already existing co-operations, the probability of continuation for newly 
initiated co-operations with science is lower, for new co-operations with other businesses it is 
almost as high as for already existing ones. 
This study is a first attempt to evaluate behavioural changes in a quantitative analysis. 
In doing so, it focuses on the collaborative aspect, which is only one form of the behavioural 
additionality concept. Unfortunately, our number of observations is rather small, so it would 
be helpful to verify the results using a larger dataset. But if the results were confirmed, the 
question would arise as to whether the government is satisfied with the long term effect on co-
operation behaviour. However, this is only one goal of R&D policy. Other objectives are 
achieved as shown in other studies, like input additionality, i.e. firms increase their innovation 
expenditures due to public direct R&D funding. In order to obtain a long term effect on co-
operation behaviour another tool might prove more successful. 
Furthermore, for the first research question, it would be helpful to have more detailed 
information on the specific co-operations, for example the size of the co-operation. We know 
the types of co-operation partners but not, for instance, the numbers of partners involved. In 
the second analysis, other measures could be discussed in order to evaluate the success of the 
funding with respect to the achievement of a longer-term behavioural change.  
Public funding might also induce behavioural changes in other areas, like the 
management of R&D. It would be interesting to extend the evaluation to other behavioural 
aspects.21 
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Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction excluding surveying 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
Mining of metal ores 
Other mining and quarrying 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
Collection, purification and distribution of water 
Construction 





Manufacture of food products and beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco products 
Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 






Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
Recycling 
IND4  23 
24 
25 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 





Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
IND6  30 
31 
32 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
IND7  33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
 
Table 6: Aggregates of funding areas 
Aggregated funding area  Funding area 
TEC1  Environment/energy/  C1  Marine and polar search 
  transportation C2  Marine  technology 
    D1  National funding of space research and space technology 
    E4  Decommissioning of nuclear facilities; risk sharing 
    F1  Socio-ecological research; regional sustainability 
    F2  Sustainable production; cleaner environmental technology 
   F7  Global  change  (including peace-building research) 
    N0  Research and technology for mobility and transport (including traffic 
safety) 
    O1  Geosciences (especially deep drillings) 
    O2  Raw material supplies 25 
TEC2  Materials  L1  Materials research; materials for emerging technologies 
    L2  Physical and chemical technologies 
    P2  Buildings; R&D for preserving the architectural heritage; road building 
R&D 
TEC3  Life science  G0  R&D in the health sector 
    H0  R&D to improve working conditions 
   K0  Biotechnology 
TEC4  ICT I1  Computer  science 
    I2  Basic information technologies 
    I3  Application of microsystems (incl. application of microelectronics; 
microperipherals) 
   I4  Production  engineering 
   I5  Multimedia 
TEC5  Cross-sectoral activities/  B0  Large-scale equipment for basic research 
  education/science S1  Vocational training research  
    S2  Other educational research 
    V0  Humanities; economics and social sciences 
   W1  Structural/innovative  (generic)  measures 
    W2  Other generic activities 
    Y2  Not R&D-relevant expenditures for vocational training – no science 
    Y3  Remaining not R&D-relevant expenditures for vocational training – no 
science 
 
Table 7: Probit estimation on being publicly funded (659 observations) 
Variables Coeff.  Std.  Err. 
ln(TURN)  -0.254 ***  0.086 
ln(TURN)2  0.026 **  0.013 
Ln(AGE)  -0.120 **  0.059 
EXINT  0.204   0.233 
RDOC  0.669 **  0.287 
RDRE  1.200 ***  0.265 
PATDL  0.274 *  0.147 
EAST  0.807 ***  0.143 
YR  0.209 *  0.116 
IND2  -0.001   0.336 
IND3  -1.170 ***  0.331 
IND4  -0.484 **  0.238 
IND5  -0.033   0.216 
IND6  -0.220   0.253 
IND7  -0.132   0.244 
CONSTANT  -0.204   0.375 
Log-Likelihood -361.799   
Pseudo R-squared  0.170   
Note:  Significant at the 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**), 10%-level (*) 26 
Table 8: Estimated average treatment effect on the untreated R&D collaborating firms 
(245 matched pairs) 
   Mean  Variable 
a) Sample 
not publicly funded  publicly funded 
p-value of two 
sided t-test 
b) 
FUND  Before matching  0  1   
  After matching  0  1   
PSCORE  Before matching  0.502  0.297  0.000 
  After matching  0.498  0.485  0.604 
Ln(TURN)  Before matching  3.451  2.641  0.000 
  After matching  3.450  3.305  0.506 
Ln(AGE)  Before matching  3.272  2.753  0.000 
  After matching  3.266  3.339  0.576 
EXINT  Before matching  0.340  0.331  0.688 
  After matching  0.340  0.363  0.463 
RDNO  Before matching  0.097  0.019  0.000 
  After matching  0.090  0.069  0.542 
RDOC  Before matching  0.215  0.124  0.002 
  After matching  0.216  0.212  0.938 
RDRE  Before matching  0.688  0.857  0.000 
  After matching  0.694  0.718  0.672 
PATDL  Before matching  0.190 0.206  0.619 
  After matching  0.192 0.180  0.804 
EAST  Before matching  0.146 0.422  0.000 
  After matching  0.147  0.143  0.927 
BCOP  Before matching  0.364  0.083  0.000 
  After matching  0.359  0.135  0.000 
SCOP  Before matching  0.190  0.267  0.025 
  After matching  0.192  0.196  0.936 
SBCOP  Before matching  0.445  0.650  0.000 
  After matching  0.449  0.669  0.000 
a) Eight industry dummies and a dummy variable indicating the year of the survey are not reported. But after matching the 
respective means are not significantly different. 
b) Standard errors of t-statistics for two sided t-test on mean equality are based on the approximation by Lechner (2001) 
which accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group.  
Note: 2 treated observations had to be dropped due to common support. 